Populism Old and New

     I dislike the use of the term “populism” to describe movements like MAGA or AfD in Germany. The rise of these movements across capitalist societies is often described as a crisis of political culture. Commentators frequently attribute populism to misinformation, irresponsible leaders, or the emotional volatility of voters. These explanations are partly true but they do not address its deeper causes. Modern so-called “populism” is better understood as a political response to tensions created by the structure of contemporary capitalism. I recall a passage from Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose. The common people, his protagonist relates, often feel a truth that elites are blind to, but then they waste that in stupid actions that distort the original feeling. (My paraphrase)

    The original populist movement in the United States was admirable.  (I did study it at an earlier period of my life.) It emerged in the late nineteenth century from a coherent moral critique of the economic system. Farmers and rural communities grasped that political institutions had become subordinated to powerful economic interests such as railroads, banks, and large corporations. Their protest aimed at restoring a democratic economy that rewarded productive labor and protected local independence.

Modern so-called populism differs from this earlier movement. It often directs political energy toward cultural or identity conflicts rather than structural economic reform. This can be explained in part by the structural conditions of modern capitalism. Economic power has become highly concentrated and mobile, while national political institutions have limited capacity to regulate it. As a result many economic tensions cannot easily be addressed through conventional policy. Political conflict therefore shifts toward symbolic and cultural issues. These proto-fascist movements can thus be understood as a distorted expression of underlying economic tensions that democratic politics struggles to confront directly.

. . .

     The original populist movement developed among farmers during the late nineteenth century. The expansion of industrial capitalism created severe pressures on rural communities. Farmers faced falling commodity prices, heavy debt, and dependence on transportation and credit systems controlled by distant financial interests. The agrarian protest that followed was not merely economic but moral. Farmers believed that the economic order had become unjust. Those who performed productive labor struggled to survive while those who controlled financial and transportation networks accumulated wealth. Populists therefore argued that the economy should serve the common good rather than the interests of concentrated capital. They proposed policies such as regulation of railroads, expansion of the money supply, and greater democratic control of economic institutions. Underlying these proposals was a conception of the economy rooted in productive work, local independence, and democratic participation.

     The agrarian critique of capitalism reflected a broader, healthier understanding of the relationship between economic life and democratic citizenship. Farmers experienced work as a meaningful activity connected to land, family, and community. Economic independence allowed many rural citizens to participate actively in local government and civic life. Political thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville observed similar conditions in early American democracy. Local institutions and independent economic activity created citizens who were accustomed to cooperation and responsibility. When economic life becomes concentrated in large institutions, these conditions weaken. Workers may experience their labor as controlled by distant authorities rather than as a form of participation in a shared enterprise. The erosion of economic independence therefore has political consequences. Citizens who lack agency in their economic lives find it difficult to exercise agency in public life.

    The populist challenge to economic power posed a significant threat to established political and economic elites. In several regions alliances began to form between poor white and Black farmers around shared economic grievances. These alliances were fragile but potentially powerful. If sustained, they might have created a broad coalition capable of challenging the economic structures that dominated rural life.

      Political leaders responded in part by mobilizing racial divisions. Appeals to racial hierarchy and fear helped weaken cooperation between groups that otherwise shared economic interests. The institutionalization of segregation and voting restrictions further limited the political influence of many farmers. Thus the populist movement gradually lost momentum. Economic power remained concentrated while political conflict in the South increasingly revolved around racial division rather than structural economic reform.

. . .

   The structure of capitalism changed during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Industrial production expanded into national and global markets. Large corporations and financial institutions gained increasing influence over economic life. Technological change and globalization reshaped labor markets and patterns of production. These developments produced increased capital accumulation (so-called “growth”) but also new forms of inequality and insecurity. Many regions experienced industrial decline, job displacement, and weakening local economies. At the same time capital became highly mobile. Firms can outsource production, shift investment, and reorganize supply chains across national borders. This mobility limits the ability of national governments to regulate economic activity. Political institutions therefore operate within an economic framework that they cannot really control.

    Modern democratic governments must deal with structural constraints when addressing economic tensions. Policies that significantly challenge corporate power or global financial markets risk capital flight, reduced investment, or economic instability. Political leaders therefore often present economic developments as unavoidable consequences of globalization or technological change. Citizens who experience economic insecurity may conclude that political institutions are unresponsive or ineffective. This perception contributes to declining trust in established political parties and institutions. At the same time many structural economic issues are complex and difficult to explain in public debate. Media systems favor narratives centered on personalities, conflicts, and cultural controversies rather than long-term economic processes. These conditions encourage political conflict to shift away from structural economic questions.

     Modern pop-fascist movements often arise in societies experiencing economic disruption, regional decline, or rising inequality. They frequently express distrust of political elites and established institutions. But the language of these movements often focuses on cultural identity, national belonging, immigration, or resentment toward perceived social elites. These themes may reflect genuine social concerns. Yet they also function as symbolic expressions of deeper economic anxieties. When structural economic issues appear politically inaccessible, political energy may be redirected toward conflicts that seem more immediate or emotionally resonant. In this way populist rhetoric can mobilize widespread dissatisfaction without necessarily addressing the structural causes of that dissatisfaction. This process has been amplified by the creation of epistemological bubbles with echo chambers made possible by the capitalist design of social media algorithms.

   Modern populism therefore differs from the original agrarian movement in an important respect. The original populists attempted to reform economic structures that they believed threatened democratic life. Contemporary populist movements often direct their criticism toward cultural or institutional elites rather than toward the structure of the economic system itself. This reflects the increasing scope and power of modern capitalism. Economic structures operate on a scale that is difficult for national politics to confront directly. Modern populism thus becomes a form of displaced protest. It expresses frustration with economic change but does so through political language that does not fully address the underlying system.

    The rise of contemporary populism cannot be understood solely as a failure of political culture or civic virtue, though it is that. It reflects deeper tensions within modern democratic capitalism. The original populist movement arose from a moral critique of economic structures that seemed to undermine democratic life. Its defeat left many of those structural tensions unresolved. Modern capitalism has intensified some of these tensions through globalization and the concentration of economic power. At the same time political institutions have limited capacity to regulate these processes. In this context these so-called populist movements emerge as political expressions of dissatisfaction with economic conditions that democratic politics doesn’t address directly.

      It expresses also the alienation millions of people experience in capitalism: from community, from healthy families, from their roots, etc. Modern so-called populism therefore represents a distorted continuation of the original populist impulse. It arises from genuine tensions between capitalism and democracy, but its political form often prevents those tensions from being confronted at their source.

 

 

Bibliography

 

Goodwyn, Lawrence. The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

 

Hicks, John D. The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1931.

 

Hofstadter, Richard. The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. New York: Vintage Books, 1955.

 

Josephson, Matthew. The Robber Barons: The Great American Capitalists, 1861–1901. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1934.