Quaestio
Whether it is morally permissible to love the world in light of its
history of radical evil
Objection 1.
It seems not. For to love the world is to affirm its existence as
good. Yet the existence of the world has entailed evils such as the trans-Atlantic
slave trade and slavery in general, genocide, famine, plague, and sexual
violence – on top of the everyday evils. To love the world would therefore seem
to involve willing the existence of a reality inseparable from such horrors,
which appears morally impermissible.
Objection 2.
Further, even if one’s own life has been marked by blessings, to
affirm the world that produced such blessings would seem to privilege one’s own
good over the unjust suffering of others. This would make love of the world
complicit in injustice.
Objection 3.
Moreover, Ivan Karamazov argues that no harmony purchased at the
price of innocent suffering can be morally justified. If the existence of the
world necessarily includes such suffering, then it would seem that one ought
morally to reject the world rather than love it.
Sed contra.
Love responds to the good as such. But evil, as Aquinas says, is not
a substance but a privation of the good. Therefore the presence of evil does
not abolish the goodness of being.
Respondeo.
I answer that to love the world need not entail approving of all that
has occurred within it, but rather affirming the goodness of being itself in
which creatures participate. The horrors of history do not constitute the being
of the world but represent privations, disorders, and failures of what ought to
be. To refuse the existence of the world on account of such evils would be to
refuse also the possibility of justice, reconciliation, or redemption, all of
which presuppose that something good is capable of being restored.
Love of the world, properly understood, does not will the existence
of evil but wills that what is good in being be preserved and fulfilled. It may
therefore coexist with protest against injustice. Indeed, the capacity to
recognize suffering as unjust presupposes some prior affirmation of the good
that has been violated. Ivan’s protest is morally intelligible only because he
loves the innocent whose suffering he rejects. Thus love of the world is not
indifference to its horrors but the condition for condemning them as
distortions of what is. In this way, amor mundi may be understood not as
reconciliation with evil but as fidelity to the goodness of being that evil
obscures without abolishing.
Replies to the Objections.
The evils of history are not necessary features of being but failures
of creatures to realize the goods proper to their nature. Love of the world
therefore need not affirm their occurrence but may affirm the reality in which
they stand as violations. The blessings of one’s own life do not justify
injustice but may dispose one to recognize goods worth preserving for all.
Finally, the rejection of the world would entail rejecting also the possibility
of the good for whose sake protest is made.
Quaestio
Whether the presence of predation and cruelty in nature prevents the
affirmation of creation as good
Objection 1.
It seems so. For in nature the survival of the strong often entails
the destruction of the weak. Predation, extinction, and competition appear
intrinsic to natural processes. If creation were wholly good, such cruelty
would not seem to be woven into its fabric.
Objection 2.
Further, human societies exhibit patterns of domination and injustice
that mirror these natural struggles. As Nietzsche argues, civilization itself
may be founded upon cruelty. This suggests that violence is not accidental but
fundamental.
Objection 3.
Moreover, if creation originates in a good source, its structures
ought not to entail the suffering of living beings. The apparent necessity of
such suffering seems incompatible with affirming creation as good.
Sed contra.
The goodness of a thing is measured by the perfection of its being.
But the order of nature exhibits intelligible structure and interdependence
among its parts.
Respondeo.
I answer that the presence of conflict and mortality in nature does
not by itself negate the goodness of creation, for goodness does not consist in
the absence of all limitation but in the fitting order of beings according to
their nature. Finite creatures participate in being imperfectly and therefore
exist within conditions of change, decay, and dependence. Predation and
competition arise within an order in which life is sustained through
interaction among diverse forms of existence.
Such processes may appear cruel when considered in isolation, yet
they belong to a system in which the flourishing of one organism may depend
upon another’s death. This does not render creation evil but marks the limits
of finite being. The injustice characteristic of human societies reflects not
merely natural struggle but the misuse of rational freedom, by which derivative
aspects of life (power, survival, advantage) are elevated as ultimate ends. To
treat these as exhaustive of reality constitutes a forgetfulness of the goods
proper to rational beings, such as justice and care.
To affirm creation, therefore, is not to deny the reality of
suffering but to recognize that the intelligibility and goodness of beings
persist even where they are vulnerable to loss. The presence of mortality and
conflict does not abolish the perfections of life but indicates the conditions
under which finite goods may be realized. Creation may thus be affirmed as good
without denying that its goodness is imperfectly participated in by creatures
capable of both flourishing and failure.
Replies to the Objections.
Predation reflects the dependence of living beings rather than an
intrinsic evil in creation. Social cruelty arises from human agency rather than
natural necessity. Finally, the suffering of creatures does not negate the
goodness of creation but reveals the limitations of finite participation in
being.
No comments:
Post a Comment