Honor

 Also a part of my unfinished dissertation

Quaestio. Whether honor, as the communal acknowledgment of excellence within shared practices, is a necessary but not sufficient good for the moral life.

 

Objection 1. It would seem that honor is not a necessary good for the moral life. For honor appears to consist in the esteem of others, which may be given or withheld on the basis of custom, prejudice, or ignorance. But the moral worth of an act does not depend upon whether it is recognized by a community, since what is just or unjust remains so even if none approve it. Therefore, honor, which depends upon public acknowledgment, is neither necessary to virtue nor constitutive of moral goodness.

 

Objection 2. Further, if honor is grounded in excellence of performance within shared practices, it would seem to be sufficient for the moral life. For in those communities where survival depends upon the reliable exercise of courage, discipline, and fidelity, the acknowledgment of those who embody such virtues secures trust and cooperation for the sake of common goods. Thus in a well-functioning sports team, in the emergency room where lives depend upon competence under pressure, or in a combat unit where the failure of one endangers all, honor marks those who may be relied upon in the pursuit of goods internal to the practice. Therefore, where honor is present, the moral life is sustained, and no further ground of obligation need be sought.

 

On the contrary, there are those who, though no longer capable of contributing to the goods internal to any practice, nonetheless make a claim upon us which it would be wrong to deny. But such a claim does not arise from excellence in performance, nor from standing within a role that sustains communal flourishing. Therefore honor, which acknowledges excellence within practices, cannot suffice as the ultimate ground of moral regard.

 

I answer that honor is a necessary but not sufficient good for the moral life. For human beings do not flourish in isolation but within shared practices ordered toward goods which can be achieved only through cooperation over time. The pursuit of such goods requires stable dispositions by which individuals may be trusted to act well under pressure and in the absence of immediate reward. Honor arises as the communal acknowledgment of those who reliably embody such dispositions, and so may be entrusted with responsibilities upon which others depend. In a sports team, it is the recognition that one will hold one’s position when the play breaks down; in the emergency room, that one will not falter when decisive action is required; in a combat unit, that one will not abandon one’s comrades when fear or fatigue presses toward flight. In communities such as Wendell Berry’s Port William, this same reality persists without being named, in the long memory by which one comes to be known as someone whose word can be trusted, whose work will be done well, and whose loyalty to neighbor and place may be relied upon without question. Such honor is not mere vanity or external reward, but the social form by which virtue becomes visible and trust becomes possible.

     Moreover, concern for one’s own honor within such practices is not merely a private regard for reputation, but a form of care for the community whose goods one shares. For to act dishonorably is not only to diminish oneself but to render oneself untrustworthy in the eyes of those who depend upon one’s reliability in the pursuit of common ends. Thus the desire to maintain one’s honor may signify a recognition that one stands in relations of mutual dependence, and that one’s failure may expose others to harm. Conversely, indifference to one’s standing within a practice may express not humility but a refusal to acknowledge the claims made by those who must rely upon one’s fidelity. In such a case, the neglect of honor becomes a species of contempt for the goods internal to the practice and for the persons who depend upon their realization.

      Yet precisely because honor is tied to excellence in functioning within a practice, it reaches its limit where such functioning is impaired or absent. The injured teammate who can no longer play, the nurse who becomes a patient, the soldier who returns unable to fight, may cease to be bearers of honor in the sense required by the practice. Nevertheless, the claim made by such persons does not diminish with their loss of excellence, nor does the wrongness of their abandonment depend upon whether they can still contribute to the goods internal to communal life. For what now becomes visible is that their worth does not derive solely from their role within a practice, but from the fact that this one exists and whose life matters beyond all considerations of performance.

     

       Accordingly, honor is necessary for the sustenance of practices through which human goods are realized in common, but insufficient as the ultimate measure of moral regard. It acknowledges the virtues by which one contributes to shared ends, but does not account for the unconditional claim made by those who can no longer do so. Thus the moral life requires both the cultivation and recognition of excellence within practices, and the acknowledgment of a dignity that exceeds such excellence.

 

Reply to Objection 1. The dependence of honor upon communal acknowledgment does not render it morally trivial, for the goods internal to shared practices cannot be sustained without forms of trust grounded in the reliable exercise of virtue. Honor signifies not the mere opinion of others, but the tested recognition that one may be entrusted with responsibilities upon which the flourishing of others depends.

 

Reply to Objection 2. The presence of honor within a practice secures cooperation toward common goods, but does not explain why the loss of one’s capacity to contribute does not entail the loss of one’s moral standing. Therefore honor sustains the moral ecology of communal life, but does not ground the absolute claim made by the person as such.