Playing Around with a Summa

 I have always wanted to do a Summa Theologia myself. Here is how I would start it.

Question 1

Does it matter what we believe?

 

Objection 1. It would seem that it does not matter what we believe. For belief is an interior disposition, and what is inward harms no one. Therefore, one belief is as good as another, since beliefs belong to the realm of private opinion, not truth.

Objection 2. Furthermore, beliefs are shaped by upbringing, culture, and unconscious forces. Since no one chooses their beliefs freely, but inherits them from circumstance, it makes no sense to say that one belief matters more than another.

Objection 3. Furthermore, in a pluralistic world, asserting that some beliefs are true and others false is an act of intolerance. To treat all beliefs as equally valid is to respect difference; to rank them is to impose power. Therefore, it is better to say that what we believe does not matter, so long as we live peacefully.

 

On the contrary, history and daily life show that beliefs have immense consequences. People kill, die, forgive, resist, build, and destroy on account of what they believe. If beliefs did not matter, why would tyrants fear them, martyrs die for them, or laws be shaped by them?

 

I answer that it matters profoundly what we believe, because belief is not a neutral or private matter, but the root of action, perception, and love. Beliefs shape our sense of what is real, what is right, and what is worth living and dying for. To believe is to see, and to see is to act.

Consider: a woman who believes her unborn child is a person will refuse abortion, even at great cost; another, who believes the fetus is not yet a person, may end the pregnancy without moral conflict. A man who believes in divine judgment may restrain revenge, while one who believes in no higher law may see violence as his only justice.

Beliefs divide peoples and unite them. A patriot dies for his country; a Marxist betrays his nation for his class. A religious believer may endure suffering in hope; a nihilist may embrace despair or destruction. A Christian may forgive a murderer; another may demand death. Each person acts from what he believes to be real and ultimate.

Even ordinary choices are shaped by belief: the one who trusts medical science may take a vaccine and live; the one who believes in conspiracy may refuse and die. The teacher who believes education forms the soul will teach differently than one who believes it is for social advancement alone.

Beliefs do not merely decorate the mind; they govern the heart. They order our loves, our fears, our loyalties, and our sacrifices. To believe is to live a certain way, and to live is always to believe something.

 

To the first objection, it must be said: Though beliefs are inward, they bear outward fruit. No tree is judged by its roots alone, but by the fruit it bears. Private convictions shape public acts.

To the second objection, we reply: While beliefs are shaped by context, they are not entirely determined. Human beings are capable of self-reflection, of repentance, of recognizing truth beyond conditioning. That we are shaped by context does not mean we are prisoners of it.

To the third objection, it must be said: Tolerance is a social good, but not a substitute for truth. The claim that "all beliefs are equal" is itself a belief, one that shapes action and excludes others. Even the refusal to judge is a form of judgment. Thus, the postmodern view that beliefs do not matter proves itself false, for it too is a belief. And it, too, matters.

 

 

Question 2

Even granting that beliefs matter, can core beliefs be matters of truth and justification? Or are they all ultimately ungrounded in reality?

 

Objection 1. It seems that core beliefs cannot be justified or known to be true. For any attempt to justify them already presupposes other beliefs, often of the same kind. Therefore, such justification is circular, and no core belief can be known as objectively grounded.

 

Objection 2. Furthermore, there exists no neutral or universal standpoint from which to evaluate conflicting core beliefs. All reasoning takes place within a tradition, worldview, or linguistic framework. Thus, what counts as justification within one system may appear nonsensical from another. Therefore, claims to truth are bound to perspective and cannot rise above it.

 

Objection 3. Moreover, the history of belief shows constant conflict between systems (religions, ideologies, moral frameworks). If no common ground exists to resolve these disputes, it follows that all core beliefs are ultimately expressions of culture, temperament, or desire – not beliefs with a claim to truth.

 

On the contrary, if no core beliefs can be justified, then the belief that “no core beliefs can be justified” also lacks justification for it too rests on assumptions about truth, reason, and knowledge. Yet this belief presents itself as universally valid. Therefore, the position refutes itself by claiming what it denies to others.

 

I answer that core beliefs can be matters of truth and justification, though not in the sense of absolute proof from a position of neutrality. Rather, they are justified within the lived coherence of a worldview, a system of thought that makes sense of experience, resists contradiction, accounts for other positions, and sustains a vision of the good, the true, and the real.

 

It is true that no one argues from nowhere. All thinking begins within a horizon – a tradition, a language, a life-world. But this does not mean that all horizons are equal, or that no meaningful comparison is possible. A worldview may be more internally coherent, more life-giving, more open to correction, or more responsive to the full range of human experience than another. The absence of neutrality does not imply the absence of judgment. We may not stand outside all traditions, but we can reflect within and across them.

 

Moreover, even those who deny truth or justification act as though some things are more real, more right, or more grounded than others. The relativist condemns injustice; the worldview-skeptic trusts science; the deconstructionist defends meaning against violence. These too are core beliefs, lived out with conviction. If all is perspective, then so is that claim, which consequently loses its power to compel.

 

Therefore, while core beliefs are not justified like theorems in geometry, they can be tested in life, in dialogue, in history, in conscience. Some collapse under pressure. Others endure, illuminate, and transform. In this way, truth remains a goal, not a possession, which, however, just not make it a fiction.

 

To the first objection, we respond: Circularity is not always vicious. Foundational beliefs form the conditions of intelligibility. One must begin somewhere, but one can still reflect, compare, and reform. Justification does not require an infinite regress.

 

To the second, we reply: While no view is entirely neutral, some are more self-aware, more open to criticism, and more capable of understanding others without collapsing into relativism. The fusion of horizons is not impossible, though it is never complete.

 

To the third, we say: That beliefs have conflicted throughout history does not imply they are all groundless. Error is the shadow of truth-seeking. The existence of disagreement shows the seriousness of the questions, not their meaninglessness.   

 

 

Question 3

Question: Can we live with fallibilism about our core beliefs while still holding and acting on them with conviction?

 

Objection 1. It seems we cannot. For if we admit our core beliefs about morality, religion, or the nature of reality might be wrong, we undermine our right to act on them as if they were true. To proceed with conviction in the face of uncertainty is either self-deception or bad faith.

 

Objection 2. Furthermore, if we acknowledge that our deepest moral and metaphysical beliefs may be mistaken, then we must suspend judgment in all serious matters. But suspension paralyzes. To say “I could be wrong” is to say “I should hesitate.” And to hesitate in the face of evil or injustice is to become complicit.

 

Objection 3. Moreover, people do act with passionate certainty. The mother loves her child; the man forgives or fights; the martyr dies in faith. These are not acts born of fallibilism, but of unwavering conviction. To reinterpret them as provisional or revisable is to misrepresent the lived reality of belief.

 

On the contrary, the very fact that we continue to act, decide, and love under conditions of uncertainty shows that fallibilism is compatible with commitment. To be human is to act in hope without omniscience, to risk love without proof, and to affirm value without absolute certainty.

 

I answer that we must distinguish between epistemic fallibilism and existential conviction. Fallibilism holds that we might be mistaken even in our deepest beliefs. It is not that we lack reasons for holding them but that no human knowledge is immune to revision or deeper insight. Yet human life demands action, and action demands orientation. Therefore, we must live as if certain not because we are infallible, but because the alternative is to be paralyzed by doubt or cynicism.

 

This tension is resolved not by abandoning fallibilism, nor by feigning certainty, but by recognizing that core beliefs are often rooted in lived experience rather than philosophical argument. There are things we know with the clarity of the heart before we can prove them with the rigor of the mind. That murder is wrong, that love is good, that a child is more than a cluster of instincts: these are truths known in the doing, in the encounter, in the being with.

 

To say “I love my children” is not to posit a theory, but to live a truth, a truth intelligible only from within love. From this flows the conviction: my children are intelligible objects of love, not just organisms. This conviction is not held in spite of fallibilism, but through it: I know I might be wrong about many things, but not about this. And if I am, then the whole structure of life collapses. Thus, core experiences serve as anchors in the sea of fallibility and test our consciously held belief systems (religions, philosophies, etc.)

 

Certainty must not be confused with arrogance, nor fallibilism with nihilism. The wise person lives between the extremes: firm in what life and conscience disclose most clearly, yet humble before the mystery and limits of human knowing.

 

To the first objection, we say: Acting with conviction does not require claiming infallibility. One can act firmly while remaining open to correction. Ultimately, our certainty in an intellectually held belief system (e.g. Christianity) is the confidence that only it can ultimately explain what a person cannot sanely deny, e.g. things like loving children, being appalled over a murder or rape, etc.

 

To the second, we reply: Suspension of judgment in some areas is a virtue; in others, a vice. Where action is demanded as in cases of justice, mercy, or protection, one must act on the best light one has, guided by those experiences of life that go deepest. Fallibilism is no excuse for moral apathy.

 

To the third, we say: Yes, people often act with certainty. But this certainty arises not from logical infallibility, but from deep alignment with experience, conscience, and relational trust. It is a certainty born of love and meaning rather than epistemic absolutism. To reinterpret it with care is to understand it more truly.