A Rare YouTube Exchange
My comment was on a lecture of Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"
I am still confused
about Quine's big idea in section 6. I can avoid saying (not judging?) that the
person who was to clean my apartment failed to do so after coming home to find
my apartment exactly as messy as it was before only by assuming other facts:
for example, someone (improbably) came into my apartment and messed it up after
the cleaner had done his work. Is this a clear illustration of Quine’s idea? It
seems to depend on “alternate facts” (subject to refutation as single claims),
not alternate meanings or concepts. As such it is hard not to assume that there
is a ‘fact of matter’ here. The terms – my apartment, clean, messy, etc. – seem
to be shared, seem impossible not to share.
'Is my friend married (a lesbian union)?'
I say she is; my friend says she isn’t, because as an evangelical Christian for
him a necessary condition for a union to be a marriage is that it be between a
man and a woman. Now here the truth depends on the meaning of marriage, and
that meaning is only intelligible in a larger web of beliefs; both my friend
and I would have to make major changes in our belief webs to change our
position. That example comes to mind when thinking about Quine. My problem: I
have always had trouble applying Quine’s idea to factual matters since the
meaning of ‘my apartment’ and ‘to clean my apartment’ can’t really mean
different things without losing touch with reality altogether (e.g. believing
we live in The Matrix). Of course, there is vagueness with what it means to
have cleaned my apartment; but in the example, the cleaner apparently did not
show up at all: either he did or he didn't. Yes, that depends on other beliefs,
I guess: there is a world of objects, etc. I could believe all conscious life
is a dream, and thus my belief that there is a fact of the matter here does
depend on beliefs that are not even in principle testable - is that what he
means?
I got a reply (amazing in itself):
If we change the fundamental definition of
marriage the logic it’s predicated on goes out the window. With these webs of
interdependent concepts, the instantiation of those concepts in reality
conceptually crumble. If a marriage is not the union of a man and a woman and
any children that come of that union. Then what is it? If it’s two people that
love each other then why can’t two friends get married? If you say it’s two
people that love each other and have sex, then are incestuous marriages wrong?
If they are, why? I think there’s serious practical implications to blowing
apart conceptual frameworks arbitrarily. Curious what you think.
The development
of my view in reply:
Thanks for your reply.
My examples were meant to illustrate a point of Quine as presented in the
professor’s talk: the idea that all of what we take to be real or factual rests
on conceptual assumptions that themselves are not factual or clearly real. So
even the fact that we have two hands could be doubted if we are willing to
doubt the reality of all our experience (perhaps we are brains in vats). The
marriage example, the person I was thinking of would have to doubt assumptions –
for him deep convictions – to change the view of marriage: that the Bible is
the word of God; that it interprets itself; that homosexuality is a perversion
according to the Bible. Since changing those deeper beliefs is not something he
can consider, he holds on to the traditional concept of marriage even though it
causes him to condemn a beloved niece. Another might feel condemning the niece
would be wrong and thus force changes in their deeper web of beliefs: one can agree
that homosexuality can be love-less and pornographic (as can heterosexual sex):
the Bible instances portray it as such (desiring to rape the angel in Sodom!).
Thus one can condemn rapacious or love-less (unnatural) sex while acknowledging
the fact that homosexuals are also natural (exist in every culture) and are
capable of love and commitment – I know of such cases. Thus while homosexual
marriage might not be the paradigm it is still a form of marriage as long as it
is based on erotic love (which is different from friendship-love but no less
love) and life-long commitment. Like the paradigm apple is red, but yellow
apples are still apples. Thus some Christians can embrace homosexual marriage
by feeling forced to adjust their understanding of homosexuality and the
Biblical references. Quine, I believe, just cares about what is logically
possible. I feel the change of marriage to include the possibility of love
between homosexual people reflects a deepening of the concept that has come
from a confrontation with reality – like my friend’s marriage and the pain of
demeaning it.
Perhaps the best conception of marriage is
the traditional vow: a promise to love, honor, and cherish one's spouse, to
stand by them in good times and bad, and to be faithful for as long as they
both shall live. The issue is whether it is intelligible that homosexuals can
seriously speak that vow. The man I am thinking of doubts this based on
pre-conceptions about homosexuality as a perversion, based on a belief that the
Bible references describe the essence of homosexuality and not just an example
of demeaning sex. For me it is intelligible because it is actual. It is a fact.
I must thus adjust my understanding of marriage, natural, love, and other
concepts to account for this. Quine – if I understand what the professor is
saying – implies that no one must confront such facts as long as they are
willing to freeze or change, as the case might be, their deeper concepts/beliefs.
That leads straight to Trump.
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