Epictetus Discourses, commentary (2)

CHAPTER 2 How a person on every occasion can maintain his proper character.

To the rational animal only is the irrational intolerable; but that which is rational is tolerable. Blows are not naturally intolerable. "How is that?" See how the Lacedaemonians endure whipping when they have learned that whipping is consistent with reason. "To hang yourself is not intolerable." When, then, you have the opinion that it is rational, you go and hang yourself. In short, if we observe, we shall find that the animal man is pained by nothing so much as by that which is irrational; and, on the contrary, attracted to nothing so much as to that which is rational.

 

Comment:

   “Rational” here means justified in the circumstances, for a higher purpose. The Spartan warrior had to be harder than all others. Experience taught them that beatings made them harder, got them used to dealing with pain. The whipping was not intrinsically good but a means to something the Spartans thought was intrinsically good: being the best warrior. The despairing man – the man who has lost all hope – will see hanging as the means to end  life that has become meaningless and thus hateful. Of course, the higher standard is the Good (for the right-thinking/feeling Christian, whether it is consistent with God’s love for the world): Is being the best warrior good in itself or a means to a higher end – or both relatively good in itself and a means to a higher end.

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But the rational and the irrational appear such in a different way to different persons, just as the good and the bad, the profitable and the unprofitable. For this reason, particularly, we need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the preconception of the rational and the irrational to the several things conformably to nature.”

 

 

 

Comment

The Good judged all ends, and thus in Epictetus’s terms: The Rational is the Good, and the Good is the Natural. For us this can be confusing as we tend to equate “rational” with logical calculation, formal logical consistency. For Epictetus – he shares this with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle – Reason is that capacity to align the mind and heart and will with reality (nature). He just has a different understanding of reality/nature, and thus human nature. Well, it does resemble Socrates of the Phaedo, but less extreme and without the immortality of the soul. He is between the Socrates of the Phaedo and Christianity somehow. What is “nature” that we ought to conform our mind-heart-will to it?

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But in order to determine the rational and the irrational, we use not only the of external things, but we consider also what is appropriate to each person. For to one man it is consistent with reason to hold a chamber pot for another, and to look to this only, that if he does not hold it, he will receive stripes, and he will not receive his food: but if he shall hold the pot, he will not suffer anything hard or disagreeable. But to another man not only does the holding of a chamber pot appear intolerable for himself, but intolerable also for him to allow another to do this office for him. If, then, you ask me whether you should hold the chamber pot or not, I shall say to you that the receiving of food is worth more than the not receiving of it, and the being scourged is a greater indignity than not being scourged; so that if you measure your interests by these things, go and hold the chamber pot. "But this," you say, "would not be worthy of me." Well, then, it is you who must introduce this consideration into the inquiry, not I; for it is you who know yourself, how much you are worth to yourself, and at what price you sell yourself; for men sell themselves at various prices.

 

Comment

Is Epictetus really saying a man’s nature is relative to the individual man? That would be surprising. I expect he will introduce some “rational” and absolute standard according to “nature.” He did live as a slave. He certainly had to hold out to piss pot, or be starved or beaten for his disobedience. What a shitty world, Rome. Worse than Putin’s Russia (though perhaps not Stalin’s). He suggests a standard in the next passages.

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For this reason, when Florus was deliberating whether he should go down to Nero's spectacles and also perform in them himself, Agrippinus said to him, "Go down": and when Florus asked Agrippinus, "Why do not you go down?" Agrippinus replied, "Because I do not even deliberate about the matter." For he who has once brought himself to deliberate about such matters, and to calculate the value of external things, comes very near to those who have forgotten their own character. For why do you ask me the question, whether death is preferable or life? I say "life." "Pain or pleasure?" I say "pleasure." But if I do not take a part in the tragic acting, I shall have my head struck off. Go then and take a part, but I will not. "Why?" Because you consider yourself to be only one thread of those which are in the tunic. Well then it was fitting for you to take care how you should be like the rest of men, just as the thread has no design to be anything superior to the other threads. But I wish to be purple, that small part which is bright, and makes all the rest appear graceful and beautiful. Why then do you tell me to make myself like the many? and if I do, how shall I still be purple? Priscus Helvidius also saw this, and acted conformably. For when Vespasian sent and commanded him not to go into the senate, he replied, "It is in your power not to allow me to be a member of the senate, but so long as I am, I must go in." "Well, go in then," says the emperor, "but say nothing." "Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent." "But I must ask your opinion." "And I must say what I think right." "But if you do, I shall put you to death." "When then did I tell you that I am immortal? You will do your part, and I will do mine: it is your part to kill; it is mine to die, but not in fear: yours to banish me; mine to depart without sorrow." [emphasis mine]

 

Comment

  Our nature – our nature as rational, not bodily creatures – seem to come with a duty to “not sell ourselves” too cheaply. What “nature” seems to require is that we all have the “dignity” of a Socrates or a Cato of Utica. This seems to imply a criticism of his life as a slave, that suicide might have been a duty, or allowing himself to be killed for disobedience? In any case, there is a clear implication that to consider yourself “to be only one thread of those which are in the tunic” is a mistaken judgment, contrary to human nature as a rational animal; and that the desire to be “purple, that small part which is bright, and makes all the rest appear graceful and beautiful” is a duty imposed on us by human nature. Philosophy frees the mind to see this. Am I inferring too much? To hang on to life at the price of your dignity seems to be a principle teaching here. The Stoic Socrates of the Phaedo seems to be the paradigm of reason and virtue.

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Some person asked, "How then shall every man among us perceive what is suitable to his character?" How, he replied, does the bull alone, when the lion has attacked, discover his own powers and put himself forward in defense of the whole herd? It is plain that with the powers the perception of having them is immediately conjoined; and, therefore, whoever of us has such powers will not be ignorant of them. Now a bull is not made suddenly, nor a brave man; but we must discipline ourselves in the winter for the summer campaign, and not rashly run upon that which does not concern us. Only consider at what price you sell your own will; if for no other reason, at least for this, that you sell it not for a small sum. But that which is great and superior perhaps belongs to Socrates and such as are like him. "Why then, if we are naturally such, are not a very great number of us like him?" Is it true then that all horses become swift, that all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? "What, then, since I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no pains?" I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates; but if he is not inferior, this is enough for me; for I shall never be a Milo, and yet I do not neglect my body; nor shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property; nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything because we despair of reaching the highest degree.

 

Comment:

And even if we don’t have Socrates’ metal, we are obligated to do our best to become like him. To free ourselves from bodily attachments when duty/reason/dignity requires it.