The Heart and the Head (again)
Edith Stein (1891-1942)Plato and
Aristotle both believed that emotional responses – which then may inform action
– could be more or less appropriate to reality. For example:
·
Aristotle
describes virtue as a state of character involving the right emotional
response. Emotions like fear, anger, or desire must hit the “mean” appropriate
to a given situation. For instance, courage is the mean between recklessness
(excessive fearlessness) and cowardice (excessive fear). Both fail to conform
to the true dangers or opportunities of a situation.
·
In the Poetics
Aristotle argues that the emotions of pity and fear aroused by dramatic action
help the audience grasp the deeper truths of human vulnerability and moral
responsibility. These emotional responses are not arbitrary but are cultivated
to align with the reality of human frailty and ethical dilemmas.
·
Aristotle
also sees emotional alignment as connected to phronesis (practical wisdom),
which ensures that one’s emotions are not only moderated but also attuned to
the particulars of each situation. For example, righteous anger in response to
injustice is what a virtuous person feels: i.e. a person who perceives and acts
according to the moral truths of the situation. A Christian saint, who sees
deeper into moral reality than Aristotle’s virtuous pagan, may temper anger
with pity.
·
For both Plato
and Aristotle, shame is not merely an unpleasant emotion but reveals moral and
spiritual misalignment. Shame also
connects the individual to the communal and divine dimensions of goodness, as
it often arises from failing to meet the expectations of others or the higher
moral order. When properly directed, shame helps us recognize our alienation
from the good and can inspire us to return to harmony with it. Plato sees this
as essential for both personal and societal virtue.
·
Plato describes prisoners in a
cave who mistake shadows for reality. Upon being freed and exposed to the true
world of forms, their emotional responses (fear giving way to awe and wonder)
manifest the nature of reality from a human perspective.
I could go on.
Plato and
Aristotle both emphasize reason in guiding emotions. For Plato, emotions, such
as desires or anger, are part of the soul's non-rational aspects and are
"blind" without the rational part, which directs them toward the good
and truth. His allegory of the chariot in the Phaedrus vividly
illustrates this dynamic, where reason must control the spirited and appetitive
elements to align the soul with its ultimate purpose. Similarly, Aristotle sees
emotions as not inherently irrational but as needing cultivation through reason
and habituation. In the Nicomachean Ethics, he underscores that virtue
involves feeling emotions appropriately, in harmony with reason’s judgment
about what is right in specific situations. Both philosophers argue that
emotions, left untethered to reason, lead to disordered lives, but when shaped
by reason, they become integral to moral excellence and an accurate
apprehension of reality. Their shared insight underscores the continuity in
their views of the rational soul's harmonizing role in human flourishing.
Emotions, while not "cognitive" in the modern sense, play a
critical motivational role in the moral and intellectual life for both
thinkers. Without emotions, the judgments of reason would lack the dynamic
force needed to inspire action. For Plato, the spirited part of the soul (thumos)
is essential for motivating the pursuit of justice and virtue. It acts as a
bridge between reason and desire, providing the energy to implement rational
judgments. In his Republic, Plato shows how emotions like shame, when
aligned with reason, become powerful allies in moral development, helping the
individual resist base desires and act in accordance with the good. Similarly,
Aristotle highlights the necessity of emotions in motivating virtuous action.
In the Nicomachean Ethics, he argues that emotions, when properly
habituated, enhance our ability to respond to situations with the right degree
of intensity and aim. While reason identifies the good, emotions provide the
energy to pursue it, and practical wisdom (phronesis) ensures their
harmony. Aristotle famously claims that virtue involves both acting rightly and
feeling rightly, suggesting that emotions, when rightly tuned, are
indispensable for moral excellence (for bodily creatures), . Thus, while
emotions are not rational in themselves, both recognize their role in ensuring
that the insights of reason are carried into action and fully integrated into
the life of the soul. C. S. Lewis summarizes this best:
. . .
And this is where my position differs. Just as emotions can be
untethered from reality (from the Good), thoughts unformed by right emotion can
also be untethered from reality. Thought about an evil done, for example,
uninformed by remorse, is equivalent to an irrational emotion (anger at your
child) disconnected from insight into reality (the reality of children in general
and your child in particular). Thoughts, when
uninformed by right emotion, can also become untethered from reality – this is
an inversion of the classical emphasis on emotions requiring the guidance of
reason. I think that emotions are not merely passive forces needing rational
correction but active contributors to the alignment of thought with reality.
- Emotions,
when attuned to the Good, can provide essential insight into moral
reality. For example, remorse over an evil act reflects not just a
cognitive judgment that the act was wrong but also a profound recognition
of its moral weight and relational consequences. What we feel tells us
what is important and feeling often precedes intellectual understanding. Without
this emotional resonance, the thought about the act remains abstract and
potentially disconnected from its full reality.
- Conversely,
thoughts lacking emotional engagement—like indifference to suffering—risk
becoming cold, detached, or even complicit in moral error. It is because
we feel pity that we know that even those most unfortunate have dignity,
for example.
Here I am close to the thought of Edith Stein,
whose work I still need to study more closely. Stein argues that emotions are
not merely subjective reactions but intentional acts that disclose values in
the world. For instance, joy reveals the value of something good achieved,
while sorrow uncovers the loss of something precious. This aligns with the
phenomenological tradition of seeing emotions as cognitive in a broad sense,
helping individuals grasp aspects of reality that might be inaccessible through
abstract reasoning alone.
My
position implies that some emotional responses – Stein's joy (also joy for C.
S. Lewis – go deeper than intellect, are spontaneous, and make possible the
deepest metaphysical and religious insights. They don’t need to be trained by
reason in the person of authorities who are rational (parents, teachers); they
judge reason. Indeed, certain emotional responses such as joy or Sehnsucht
can reach deeper than intellect, arising spontaneously and serving as a gateway
to profound metaphysical and religious understanding. Joy, for Stein and C. S.
Lewis, is not just an affective state but an engagement with the world that
reveals the fullness of value inherent in a meaningful experience. In her
analysis, Stein considers emotional acts as rooted in the soul's depth, where
they connect to spiritual and metaphysical dimensions. Joy, for instance, might
arise spontaneously in response to beauty, truth, or goodness, transcending
intellectual deliberation and providing direct insight into the essence of
these realities. Such emotional acts are pivotal in religious experiences,
where they open the person to the divine, facilitating an intuitive grasp of
the sacred that might elude purely rational thought.

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