POSTMODERNISM: Some Reflections

                                                        Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1948)

 

Like many people, I dislike this term and the cliches associated with it. I some senses I am also ‘post’ modern: that is, I am a critic of certain aspects of modernity, which in a still more radical form are the aspects of the postmodern I am critical of. I will skip the labels and focus of some of the ideas I find problematic. These will be loose reflections only.

 

There are aspects of classical liberalism (in the tradition of Locke, Hume, and Mill) that I find indispensable; others I criticize. I resist the idea that liberal democracy as arose during the Enlightenment is nothing but an illicit universalizing of a European/American, middle-class, white, male perspective – of no value beyond that category; a form of oppression of marginalized groups. It is not wrong to say it was the ideology of the middle class in the early stages of capitalism and the industrial revolution. It is not wrong to say European (mostly British) men formulated it. I agree that outside of that socio-economic context it may make no sense: I suppose it made little sense to Tecumseh, for example; it would probably have made no sense to Japanese Samurai of the 17^th century. The idea that an individual has natural rights and in that respect are all equal disclosed something about our humanity – perhaps in distorted, culturally thick form – that most pre-modern regimes repressed. Yes, natural rights were a gift of culture, of a particular culture in a specific historical constellation. But I for one do not want to undo that aspect of the Enlightenment. I don’t want to return to a society in which torture is fine or in which witches and heretics were burned at the stake. The idea that an idea is tainted by its origin – that it originated largely in the minds of white middle-class men in this case – is a fallacy. I wouldn’t give a damn if it arose in a Japanese fishing village, a medieval nunnery,  or in the halls of Montezuma. I am grateful for anything good from my past irrespective of its contingent origin.

 

. . .

 

In a graduate philosophy course called “Conservative Thought,” I read Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition (I was also introduced to Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Foucault in this course.).  We discussed the by now well-known themes: the incredulity toward “meta-narratives” – the grand, all-explaining “narratives” like Marxism, Naziism, Thomist Christianity, Enlightenment progress, etc. as ultimate justifiers of knowledge (beliefs) and action; the rise of the computer society and the commodification of knowledge at the expense of truth and wisdom; skepticism concerning the representations of reality we make through language and art; the loss of legitimacy of institutional repositories of expert knowledge. All of these categories are so vague. I wish some meta-narratives had lost their potency. Then one economic blueprint destroys whole rural farming communities and working-class communities, when it thus causes the loss of local knowledge of the land and people, then, yes, I say fuck that economic meta-narrative. (I still recall a speech by Angela Merkel in which she cited a statistic about the decline of farmers from 30% in the GDR to 4% with the matter-of-fact assurance that this was a necessary adjustment to the modern economic philosophy – without a thought for the destruction of the village culture and the loss of knowledge and skills that had been accumulated over generations. The same kind of thing happened in Stalinism.) Yes, I judge a meta-narrative by its fruits. The fruits are always local and personal. But we can’t live without metaphysics, whether in the form of religion or not. (Nihilism is also a metaphysics; so is pragmaticism.) That would be like trying to communicate with language without grammar or logic.

 

. . .

 

Epistemic pluralism is another theme of ‘postmodern’ thought that I am sympathetic to. No epistemic relativism – sometimes the one is confused with the other. Enlightenment thought often assumes that one model of rationality is valid universally. Thus the scientific method is often considered to be rationality as such and applied in all areas of life – you can study ‘literature science’ in Germany. This is because reality (ontology) is interpreted as being just what a perfect science (defined by the methods scientists actually use) would tell us it is – and nothing more. This wished-for ontology defines the parameters of much Enlightenment-liberal belief in its ‘realism.’ As a philosopher I admire, Hilary Putnam, put it: “What I used to find seductive about metaphysical realism is the idea that the way to solve philosophical problems is to construct a better scientific picture of the world (Representation and Reality, p. 107).” Or, it is the same in modern philosophy: the entire philosophy of the past was discredited because it was naïve: it did not make the ‘critical turn’ that Descartes initiated with his methodical skepticism.  Take a form of rationality that works for some particular purpose and make it the imperial ruler over all other forms of rationality in every context, and you have the Enlightenment and modernity. In this, I side with the so-called postmodernism. No doubt science in its social meaning – for better or worse – functions as discourse in Foucault’s sense and ideology in Marx’s sense.

     Where I draw the line is here: the practice of science is not discourse; it represents reality (nature) if only from a very narrow point of view. It is a form of reason tailored to knowing certain things about the way the universe works. In science, 'data' refers to empirical evidence collected through observation, measurement, and experimentation, serving as the foundation for testing hypotheses and developing scientific theories. An observation can only count as a datum if interpretation is bracketed out: everyone regardless of background or worldview must agree that, for example, the atmospheric temperature is at a certain place and time is a certain value. The recorded average global surface temperature for a specific year consists of many discrete measurements (the data) taken from various locations around the world. These individual temperature readings, collected from weather stations, satellites, and ocean buoys, are the 'data'. Each measurement represents a data point that contributes to the overall dataset. When aggregated and analyzed, these discrete measurements allow scientists to calculate the average global surface temperature and identify trends, test hypotheses, and refine scientific theories about climate change. The point is that the data are intersubjectively verifiable and reliable in the sense that all scientists offer compatible descriptions. There is no room for subjectivity or interpretation here.

   Continuing, a hypothesis is a testable statement or prediction about natural phenomena; for example, "Increased atmospheric CO2 levels contribute to global temperature rise." To test this, scientists gather data on CO2 levels and global temperatures over time through methods like ice core samples, satellite observations, and weather station records. They analyze this data for correlations and causal relationships using statistical methods and climate models. If the data supports the hypothesis, it gains credibility; if not, it may be revised or rejected. A scientific theory is a well-substantiated explanation based on a body of evidence and multiple tested hypotheses, integrating and explaining a wide range of phenomena. In climate science, validated hypotheses about factors influencing climate change are integrated into the theory of anthropogenic climate change. Continuous data collection refines and validates theories, with the theory of climate change predicting future patterns based on current trends, guiding policymakers and scientists. In the context of climate change, data on CO2 levels and temperatures help test hypotheses about its causes and effects, contributing to the comprehensive theory of anthropogenic climate change, which is supported by diverse lines of evidence and has significant predictive power for future climate conditions.

    Fossil fuel burning is either causing the climate to warm or not. Science is the rational way to approach this question, it doesn’t matter whether you are Muslim or Jew, Christian or Buddhist, atheist or pagan.  There is no Jewish or pagan science. Science can indeed represent reality but from a limited point of view. Science cannot tell me what is real, good, beautiful, true, rational per se, or wise. Science is not a religion or a metaphysics. When it aspires to this, it can become used as discourse or ideology. Carl Sagen and Richard Dawkins are examples of scientists taking on another role as discourse propagators. People confuse these two faces of science and thus believe silly things like vaccines cause autism or a witch doctor is just as scientific as a practicing scientist; or that any belief that is not justified by science (e.g. I love my children. The birch trees are beautiful.) are ultimately unreal.

   When postmodernism becomes metaphysical – claiming that everything is text or discourse – then I part ways with it.

I will go on with this later.