Underdetermination

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Underdetermination

    Underdetermination, as articulated by philosopher W.V.O. Quine, refers to the idea that evidence available to us is in principle insufficient to uniquely determine the truth of a metaphysical system of belief - at least that is how I will apply his idea, which he applied to scientific theories.[1] I almost want to see the idea as a critical thinking tool. It can be illustrated through the historical example of the Ptolemaic and Copernican models of the universe.

   In ancient astronomy, the Ptolemaic model posited that the Earth was at the center of the universe, with the planets and stars orbiting around it in complex epicycles. This geocentric model provided a mathematical framework that accurately predicted the positions of celestial bodies observed from Earth. Similarly, Copernicus proposed a heliocentric model where the Sun was at the center, with Earth and other planets revolving around it in circular orbits. Both models were capable of explaining the observed movements of the stars and planets, but they differed fundamentally in their assumptions about the structure of the cosmos.

    The crucial point here is that during their time, both the Ptolemaic and Copernican models were underdetermined by the available evidence. Observations of celestial phenomena could be explained by either model, and additional evidence beyond mere observation was needed to conclusively decide between them. Eventually, as more precise observations and advancements in astronomy emerged, it became clear that the Copernican model provided a simpler and more accurate explanation of planetary motions but the Ptolemaic model could have been adjusted to fit the data, too. Both systems can predict when Venus will be the morning star and when the moon will rise. They refer to the same observable phenomena but explain them in different ways. This historical example demonstrates how scientific theories can be underdetermined by empirical evidence at a given point in time, highlighting the provisional nature of scientific knowledge and the need for ongoing investigation and refinement. I myself accept this in the abstract, logical sense, but believe there are good reasons to believe the Copernican system nevertheless models the solar system better. But when it comes to core convictions, theological or metaphysical beliefs, or ethics, the matter is more complex. Underdetermination is a more intractable problem in that area. 

   Underdetermination can be illustrated in the context of psychological theories, particularly when comparing Freudian explanations with alternative psychological frameworks regarding the origins of neurosis, such as attachment theory. Freudian psychoanalysis proposes that neuroses stem from unresolved conflicts and desires related to early childhood experiences, particularly the relationship with the mother. According to Freud, experiences such as unresolved Oedipal or Electra complexes, or issues with maternal nurturing, can manifest later in life as neurotic symptoms. For example, a person with neurosis might exhibit symptoms like anxiety or obsessive behavior that Freudians attribute to unresolved psychological conflicts rooted in childhood experiences.

   On the other hand, attachment theory, proposed by John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth, offers an alternative explanation for neurosis based on the quality of early attachments with caregivers, particularly the mother. Attachment theory suggests that the nature of early attachment experiences shapes individuals' internal working models of relationships and influences their emotional regulation and behavior throughout life. In this framework, insecure attachment styles—such as anxious or avoidant attachments—can lead to neurotic symptoms as individuals struggle with interpersonal relationships and emotional regulation. 

   I don't think Popper's falsifiability criterion offers a clean distinction between science and pseudo-science. Scientists usually don't reject a theory because a particular set of data pushes against it. Uranus's' orbit conflicted with Newtonian physics. Rather than give up Newtonian physics, astronomers believed there must be a cause for the orbital differences, which led to the discovery of Neptune. But when it comes to religious or metaphysical webs of belief, the indeterminate nature of the evidence can always in principle be accounted for by different belief systems with no independent check possible. I felt the presence of an angel while contemplating death in the hospital; I suffered from wishful fantasy produced by fear - a psychological defense mechanism. There is no way to evaluate the evidence of my experience that doesn't already presuppose a metaphysics. 

 

    The underdetermination arises because both Freudian psychoanalysis and attachment theory can equally explain observed neurotic symptoms. A person with neurosis may exhibit behaviors and emotional patterns that could be interpreted through either lens: Freudian theory might focus on unconscious conflicts and desires stemming from early relationships, while attachment theory might emphasize the impact of early attachment experiences on interpersonal functioning and emotional stability.  This example illustrates how psychological theories, like scientific theories more broadly, can be underdetermined by the available evidence. Both Freudian psychoanalysis and attachment theory provide plausible explanations for neurotic symptoms. Additional evidence and research cannot definitively determine which theory provides a more comprehensive and accurate account.

   The underdetermination of psychological theories like Freudian psychoanalysis and attachment theory regarding the origins of neurosis highlights the complexity of interpreting human behavior and the limitations of empirical data alone in determining the validity of competing explanations. In the case of neurosis, both Freudian and attachment theories offer compelling frameworks that can explain observed behaviors and emotional patterns. However, neither theory can be definitively confirmed or refuted solely based on empirical evidence. In addition, we must always “make sense” and that is a function of our lives, our belief systems, our conceptual webs such that what makes sense to a Catholic may not make sense to an atheist.

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Another illustration. Thinking about how we can – or cannot – adjust our concepts to accept or reject a new situation, I think we are forced into a situation that most scientists would deny is part of science. In a scientific experiment, the conceptual uniformity made possible by stipulated terms and mathematics makes it possible for reality to almost force its truth on you. In the famous experiment that secured the truth of Einstein’s equations over those of classical mechanics, that is Newtonian physics, the light from the star behind the sun relative to the earth reached the earth, just as Einstein’s equation predicted and the concept of gravity shifted.  A fact of nature pressed hard against Newton’s theory.

        When thinking about marriage, most people of my age started with a conception such that it was only intelligible that marriage was a union between a man and a woman. People who saw marriage primarily as a union based on love, in the context of a history of bigotry against people who for whatever reasons had romantic feelings towards others of the same sex, invited those of us who had only been able to conceive of marriage as a union between a heterosexual couple to re-imagine the concept – and many could, though not all. 

         But as with any use of a word, every individual must ask: does the non-standard use make sense? There is nothing outside the realm of meaning – as the light from the star behind the sun in the famous experiment was outside of both equations that defined gravity in physics – that could force one on pain of irrationality to accept the re-conceptualization of marriage. There is no fact of the matter. Any facts take on significance only in light of the ‘theory,’ which is in this case the conceptual book of marriage people carry around with them. 

       For me, I came to see, what I had been blind to before, that those who would withhold marriage from gay people as expressing with an attitude completely void of love or generosity. But for many of them, given their belief system, some could see their withholding in their own eyes as the only decent thing they could do – much as some people in medieval times thought that burning a witch at the stake was the only way to save her soul. The concept of marriage is embedded in a much deeper web of conceptualizations, attitudes, and beliefs, and it is at that level that further attempts at a fusion of horizons would have to take place.  For example, to accept same-sex marriage a conservative Baptist would either have to give up his belief that the Bible was the sacred – and easily understood – word of God or that he had been living according to a bad interpretation of the Bible, which would imply that the Bible was not so easy to interpret after all. In any case, embracing same-sex marriage would force the conservative Baptist to give up a core conviction that he had until that time lived by. No facts I could cite would alone have to power to overturn that core conviction. If I said ‘Look at that couple, they are loving and responsible; your views hurt them’ – they might reply ‘ I have no doubt they imagine they love each other, but they are violating God’s law, cutting themselves off from their Creator, and for the good of their souls I must not give into your argument.’

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You can believe that Trump won the 2020 election, global warming is a hoax, vaccines are a hoax, the earth is flat, the earth is the center of the solar system, that God is Creator, that the universe is an accident, that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in our science, that there are fewer things, etc. If you are willing to adjust your other beliefs and concepts such that they cohere.

  Now I don't know how I stand on the philosophy of these matters - I suppose I am a sort of "realist" who also accepts that facts depend on other beliefs. (I roughly agree with Catherine Z, Elgin, "Non-Foundationalist Epistemology: Holism, Coherence, and Tenability.")  However that may be, when confronted with a Big Lie I take it as a sign of irrationality - and perhaps mental illness - to adjust all my other beliefs into utterly absurd beliefs so that I don't have to face the painful truth that the Big Lie is indeed a lie. 

Question: Is that not an essential feature of all properly metaphysical or religious belief systems? Even of all belief systems (like MAGA) that function as a metaphysical-religious belief system?

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[1] I am no Quine expert, but I believe his attempt to show that scientific theories are underdetermined with respect to the data (reality) relied on making changes in one’s metaphysical conceptual web, i.e. really amounted to a radical underdetermination of metaphysics with respect to reality. That leads directly to Nelson Goodman’s ‘Irrealism.’ But I cannot argue that here.