Ramblings

This might bore the heck out of you – just exploring some philosophical connections. Mostly between Wittgenstein and Marx (with a side glance to Quine). In particular, I see interesting connections between what Marx called ‘forms of social consciousness’ (Bewusstseinsformen) and Wittgenstein explored as (conceptual) grammar (and Quine’s ‘conceptual web’ or ‘frameworks’ as used by other philosophers). Forms of social consciousness shape societal norms, values, and ideologies, while Wittgensteinian grammar elucidates the rules and structures that govern language and social practices: two sides of the same coin, almost.

I wrote about ideology before. Marx distinguishes forms of social consciousness from ideology. The (in my youth) standard public statement “Columbus discovered America” is ideology; the corresponding form of social consciousness or general principle that underlies and governs this statement would be the largely (in my youth) ‘All human discernment is European.’ Forms of social consciousness are like Kant’s a priori forms of understanding brought down to earth. Kant's a priori forms of understanding (a priori: not from experience but structuring experience), including space, time, and the categories of the understanding, are thought provide the necessary framework through which human cognition organizes and comprehends sensory experiences. These forms are not derived from experience but are inherent in the structure of the human mind, shaping how we perceive, interpret, and understand the world around us. Our minds (or brains) contribute space, time, substance, etc. to the world; the world does not imprint these phenomena onto to mind in experience. Just so forms of social consciousness function to structure experience, to make the quality of experience we have possible. We don’t learn ‘All discernment is European’ as a direct lesson in school. Our brains unconsciously infer it from language use just as it does the grammar of our language. And just as grammar – both in the linguistic and Wittgensteinian sense of conceptual grammar – structures our minds and uses of language, so do social forms of consciousness structure our beliefs about the world.  These forms of consciousness are not mere reflections of objective reality but actively shape and reinforce social hierarchies and power dynamics.

   Marx – not very clearly – interprets the ‘grammar’ of social forms of consciousness like this:

1.    The existing social order cannot be fundamentally changed. An ideological belief that reflects this underlying principle might be: Socialism failed economically and was totalitarian politically (USSR). Thus the current capitalist order is the only economically rational order. There is no alternative. For Marx, the commodification of labor under alienates workers from the products of their labor and from each other. Forms of social consciousness in this context include beliefs in the naturalness of market forces and the inevitability of economic competition, which obscure the social relations of production and perpetuate alienation.

 

2.    The preferred social order is morally good. Its ideological expressions include is accords with Divine Will, or it is free, or it represents progress or civilization, etc. ‘All human discernment is European’ is a variant of that. Aquinas’ justification of the feudal controllers of land as ‘natural’ is another example.

 

3.    What does not comply with the existing social order is blameworthy. Thus social protest is ‘extremist,’ reformers are ‘agitators,’ foreign opponents are ‘criminal’ or ‘barbarous,’ etc.  

 

4.    Whatever social status enjoyed by individuals in the social order reflects their intrinsic worth. So billionaires are paragons of virtue for capitalism-lovers. Ideologies of meritocracy and individualism obscure systemic inequalities and justify the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few.

 

5.    The social order represents the interests of all people in the society. So those at the bottom “consent” to capitalism because they would have it worse in another system.

 

6.    A part of the social order represents the whole of society. A society without owners of capital and those who work for them is unintelligible.

I could go on.

When part of the social grammar becomes conscious and a point of contention – like All human discernment is Western – it can destabilize the social system, as we see now in America, which is in a quasi-revolutionary situation marked by conflict on all these principles of social grammar or forms of social consciousness. But the revolution is a bit superficial, taking place at the level of the ‘superstructure.’ No one proposes changing the economic-technical base. At most people like Bernie Sanders want to place some moral and political constraints on its power, as did FDR.

  For Marx, of course, all these grammatical points applied to capitalist society would illusions – like in Plato’s cave. Only in a communist (perfectly just society corresponding with human nature) would social grammar not give rise to ideology. I can’t agree. Liberal capitalism is not all rotten, though what was good about it has been eroding fast and what is rotten is getting unbearable. There were even some good things in the German Democratic Republic: education and medical care were available at no extra cost beyond taxation for every person; the rents were low and the necessities of life affordable; there was no homelessness. It is never so black-and-white. Social grammar gives rise to ideology only when one regime claims to be perfect or to represent perfection, making all other regimes into orcs. Of course, some regimes are orcish. But no regime is divine or even angelic. Revolutions invariably produce misery and destruction and then result in some form of tyranny. Reform – continual, never-ceasing reform is the way I think we should go. Take what is good, preserve that, and build on it.

( I learned this from the best book on Marx ever: John McMurtry, The Structure of Marx’s Worldview, 1978, which was recommended by a professor under whom I studied Marx in 1980, Herbert Reid of the University of Kentucky. “What are they teaching folks at university???” I can hear a MAGA exclaim. I dealt with a great variety of perspectives at university, from conservative Christian to Marxian and post-modern. How wonderfully free was my university at that time. Well, a university is not Sunday school, or shouldn’t be. This raises questions I have to deal with later. But I believe the upbringing of young children must be mostly ‘conservative’ – reflect the forms of social consciousness of a real community, a relatively free one preferably, precisely so that they have a foundation to begin the serious adult task of making sense of the world, of making sense of plurality. The uprooted won’t be able to understand much or even care about understanding much, as the present state of Western humanity shows.)

. . .

   Wittgenstein's concept of grammar shifts the focus to language and its rules, highlighting how language structures our understanding of the world and shapes social practices. Grammar, in Wittgensteinian terms, refers not only to syntax and grammar rules but also to the implicit rules, norms, and conventions that govern language use and social interactions.

 

·        Language Games: Wittgenstein introduced the concept of language games to illustrate how language is embedded in social practices and contexts. Different forms of social consciousness create different language games, where the rules and meanings of words are defined by their use in specific social contexts. For example, the language game of economics defines terms like "value," "profit," and "capital" according to capitalist forms of social consciousness, thus determining how they are used and when common sense is violated. Economics is a hybrid between empirical correlations in the economic sphere, models to predict economic tendencies, and an ideology of capitalism.

 

·        Forms of Life: Wittgenstein argued that language is intertwined with forms of life—shared practices, customs, and beliefs that constitute social reality. Forms of social consciousness shape forms of life, defining what is meaningful, intelligible, and acceptable within a given society. For instance, religious forms of social consciousness define forms of life centered around rituals, beliefs, and moral values that govern religious communities. Religion typically justifies certain power structures – as Aquinas justified feudal lords or evangelicals justify billionaires as graced by God in today’s America, forcing them to be blind to or reinterpret the teachings of Jesus (Matthew 19:24; 25:40). And thus forms of social consciousness condition and limit how religion is understood and practiced. The grammar of ‘sin’ is thus conditioned and becomes ideological when applied to concrete actions and particular people. Within the community of evangelicals it ‘doesn’t make sense’ to imagine the kind of greed that motivates a hedge fond manager like Jared Kuschner – who traded his influence in government for 2 billion Saudi dollars as ‘sin.’

 

·        Family Resemblances: Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances suggests that meanings are not fixed but are interconnected through overlapping similarities. Similarly, forms of social consciousness create networks of meaning and understanding that shape how individuals interpret and navigate social realities. That allows a concept like ‘sin’ to take on uses special to social groups, which are in turn partly defined by an ideology and its underlying forms of social consciousness.

 

What makes sense depends on conceptual grammar. Conceptual grammar at some level is conditioned for forms of life. Forms of life embody forms of social consciousness and the ideologies they give rise to. The use of ‘discover’ in the statement “Columbus discovered America” is an example. (Lichtenberg, the German aphorist that lived during the time of George Washington, wrote: The American who first discovered Columbus made a bad discovery.)

  Marxian forms of social consciousness and Wittgensteinian grammar analysis together elucidate how ideologies, norms, and language are interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Marx's analysis provides a loose basis for understanding how economic relations shape social consciousness and ideologies, influencing language use and social practices. Wittgensteinian grammar, on the other hand, offers a linguistic framework for examining how forms of social consciousness manifest in language and social interactions, constructing and maintaining social reality.

     In capitalist societies, for example, forms of social consciousness make ideologies of individualism and free market competition seem ‘obvious’ or part of ‘common sense.’ Wittgensteinian grammar reveals how these ideologies are embedded in everyday language use, where terms like "entrepreneurship," "efficiency," and "consumer choice" carry specific meanings that reflect capitalist values and norms. Marxian analysis highlights how forms of social consciousness, such as nationalism or class consciousness, shape political discourse and power relations. Wittgensteinian grammar illustrates how political ideologies are articulated through language games that define political identities, policies, and strategies.

   Unlike Marx, I don’t think “relations of production” and “means of production” alone determine the ways we can understand ourselves. Take an oppositional language game – call it post-colonialism. There is a whole glossary of terms. For example, ambivalence takes on different rules of use, like a new branch on the larger tree of meanings. This within the postcolonial language game it means something like: “The ambiguous way in which colonizer and colonized regard one another.  The colonizer often regards the colonized as both inferior yet exotically other, while the colonized regards the colonizer as both enviable yet corrupt.  In a context of hybridity, this often produces a mixed sense of blessing and curse.” Someone uninitiated to this discipline (form of life?) will not understand the term in this use without much effort.

    Here is an example of the kind of ‘discourse’ this social complex of academics and activists produces:

In unsettling the certainties of the Western philosophical canon, we advocate for a radical epistemic plurality that honors and incorporates the diverse knowledges and ontologies of marginalized communities. Decolonial epistemologies offer a transformative potential to reconfigure our understanding of knowledge, power, and justice in a way that is more inclusive, equitable, and responsive to the lived realities of subaltern subjects. Through this decolonial praxis, we seek to contribute to the ongoing project of dismantling the colonial matrix of power and fostering a more just and pluriversal world, while maintaining a critical awareness of the complexities and challenges inherent in this endeavor.

 

An outsider to this movement will immediately notice that the language usage departs in significant ways from his own. If the outsider finds himself in some sympathy with the politics involved, he might find the jargon like an admission ticket to a special movement. Others may perceive the rhetoric as alienating, elitist, and confusing. Underlying motives for how people respond are also diverse, affecting meaning. Some may be consumed by resentment; some may be genuinely concerned with justice; some may be fascinated by different possible worlds; some may see in postcolonialism an attempt to demean and orc a way of life that one loves and identifies with; some may see it as a way to get tenure, Etc. Depending on such factors, how I understand an utterance within this ‘discourse’ – also a jargon word – may differ from yours.

    Departures from the grammar of ordinary use often signal deeper breaks from forms of social consciousness. The word “knowledges” is used in the text. Knowledge is a non-count, abstract noun. Using it in the plural doesn’t make sense – unless you are introducing new wine in the old bottle. There are many examples of non-count abstract nouns used in the plural: epistemologies, ontologies, etc. Indeed, it is an axiom (a kind of form of social consciousness) in this movement that seeing terms like knowledge as non-count is ideological, making it seem that there is an essence and purpose (to use Aristotelian terms) of knowledge whereas postcolonial is founded on the unquestioned axiom that there is a best a loose family resemblance (no essence) in different knowledges (forms of knowledge). Being blind to this is a kind of ideology that masks other equally valid knowledges.

   The discussion about essentialism in both gender and knowledge reveals significant shifts in how these concepts are understood. In postcolonial discourse, the move from using "knowledge" to "knowledges" parallels the shift from a binary understanding of gender to recognizing multiple genders, for example: the shift from saying ‘there are many ways to be a man or a woman’ to ‘there are many genders.’ These changes challenge the idea of fixed, universal categories, instead emphasizing diversity, context-dependence, and inclusivity. By acknowledging multiple knowledges and genders, these frameworks reveal underlying assumptions and power dynamics in traditional epistemologies and gender binaries, fostering a more nuanced view of human experience and understanding.

   So if we are setting up a list of ‘forms of social consciousness’ for postcolonialism, it would include nominalism: the denial that the diverse meanings of ‘knowing something’ in diverse practices or forms of life is equivocal and not analogical. Nominalism is the denial of essence or Idea: the denial that something essential in reality justifies my including both trees under the same concept ‘birch tree.’ The two trees are, in reality, irreducibly independent entities. My languages and my culture's classification of them as ‘Birch trees’ is just one arbitrary system of classification among others. To presume it truly captures something about nature could thus only be ideology, a mask to elevate one interpretation (of an inkblot, for that is what reality means in this system) over others that are equally valid. Like colonialism did and does. The metaphysics of Nominalism has thus been grafted onto Postcolonial thought, or rather Postcolonial thought has been grafted onto the template of Nominalism, which functions as a form of social consciousness within this project to the ideological use of language – knowledges.

    This is an unfortunate marriage if Nominalism can be shown to be incoherent. I see nothing in the project itself that requires one to embrace Nominalism. I assume two different knowledges might be, for example, scientific-industrial agriculture and the agricultural practices of a “marginal” people like the Amish. There are beliefs and practices that count as ‘knowledge’ within each system, though the criteria of what count as ‘knowledge’ are different. The main point of Postcolonialism is not to elevate the criteria of scientific-industrial knowledge (as applied in an agricultural context) over traditional, handicraft criteria, demeaning the latter as a preparation to destroy it. I am in 100% agreement with that! But to even make sense, the use of knowledge as applied to both scientific-industrial and Amish cannot be equivocal, cannot logically-conceptually be utterly different concepts. Amidst different there must also be some core similarity. That core similarity is difficult to formulate in a way that commands universal agreement but it might go something like this: for anything whatsoever to count as knowledge, there must be no compelling reason to doubt its truth and there must be some compelling evidence or reasoning to justify it as true. The Amish have experience over many generations of what works and what doesn’t; agrobusiness formulates hypothesis and tests them. There is overlap here. The only real function of ‘knowledges’ is thus the rhetorical one of emphasizing plurality. Yet the Nominalism is definitive of Postcolonialism – as opposed to another movement that just cared about truth and justice. I can believe that the literature of native Americans is valuable and that my love of Shakespeare should not devalue it without being a Nominalist. I can love a book written or dictated by Black Elk for the same kind of reasons that I love Shakespeare. And not being a Nominalist I can treasure my common humanity with Black Elk, rather than see him as utterly alien – which to me is a kind of demeaning in itself. That for me is an indication that Postcolonialism is about more than truth and justice.

 

. . .

   

  Now Postcolonialism is a project within capitalist society that cannot be easily reduced to the kinds of concerns that concerned Marx. Indeed, from the perspective of Postcolonialism, Marx is a representative of the problem. The grafting of ‘ideology’ and ‘forms of social consciousness’ onto Postmodernism allows some insights, but since we largely ignore the “means of production” and “relations of production” – obviously there is some sort of relationship if not one of determination – the meaning those terms had for Marx shifts.

  I would add something to Marx. The forms of social consciousness and ideology both tend to general epistemological bubbles and echo chambers. This is because of power. That is, when beliefs, conscious and unconscious, are pressed into the service of political conflict, people and groups use them to define identities and exclude (or orcify) opponents. They need not serve this function but they can and often do. I think that is how Nominalism became useful for Postcolonialism. During my life at the university I have witnessed an intense war over the content which and people who drive the humanities. The traditional liberal arts / great books curriculum was largely driven out by the culture studies / postcolonial studies. What might have been compatible philosophies and approaches become ideological, and ideologies depend on deeper principles. Nominalism – and its accompanying cultural, linguistic, and conceptual relativisms – served Postcolonialism well as an ideology to fight against the liberal arts. This is what went beyond truth and justice.

I’ve been rambling. Will stop here. Didn’t even start the thought I was most interested in today. Maybe tomorrow.